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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----00000----

ROBERT W. ADKINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 19170

DIVISION OF STATE LANDS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH,
Defendant-Respondent.
----00000----

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
----00000----

NATURE OF THE CASE

Plaintiff-Appellant initiated this action seeking a
declaratory judgment that an oil, gas and hydrocarbon lease
erroneously entered into with the Division of State Lands
and Forestry is valid and binding, despite the fact the land
involved in the lease has at all relevant times to this
matter been withdrawn from oil, gas and hydrocarbon exploration and development by order of the State Land Board.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOl'iER _c_QUR'J.'
After hearing cross motions for summary judgment,
the court issued a Memorandum Decision in which the
court held that Plaintiff-Appellant had failed to comply
with the jurisdictional requirements for judicial review
in this case, §65-1-9(2) and §63-30-1
(1953), as amended.

~ ~.,

U.C.A.

Appellant's motion for summary judg-

ment was denied, Respondent's motion for summary judgment
was granted, and the action was dismissed with prejudice.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment of the
trial court in all respects.
INTRODUCTION
The trial court dismissed Appellant's lawsuit on
jurisdictional grounds as will be discussed in detail,
ini.r..g_,

claims.

and, therefore, did not reach the merits of his
By way of brief introduction in order to place this

appeal in perspective, it is important to note that this
lawsuit has come about because an oil, gas and hydrocarbon
lease was issued to the Appellant by the Respondent,
Division of State Lands and Forestry, when it should never
have been issued at all.

The land which was leased had been

previously withdrawn from oil and gas leasing by the State
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Land Board and was, therefore,
anyone.

unavailable to be leased to

The mistake in issuing this lease occurred because

even though the land had been withdrawn from oil and gas
leasing, the withdrawals were not indicated properly on the
plat maps which identify state-owned lands and which are
located in the offices of the Division of State Lands and
Forestry.

The Division is charged with the day-to-day

management of approximately 3.6 million acres of land,
most of which lie in scattered, isolated sections of land
throughout the State.

(R. 78-81) Although it is not known

for sure why the withdrawals of these lands were not
indicated properly on the Division's plat maps,

it is

believed the oversight occurred when the Division changed
its state-wide plat mapping system in 1980.

(R. 78-80) Thus,

even apart from the jurisdictional issues in this matter, if
it were to be decided a mineral lease .l!l..l.l§.i_ be issued
contrary to the State Land Board's determination that this
land should be withdrawn from oil and gas leasing, such a
decision would have devastating implications on the day-today administration of state-owned lands because it would, in
effect, require the Division to act according to a standard
of perfection in carrying out its land management responsibilities.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In March 1980 Appellant, Mr. Robert

w.

Adkins, applied

for an oil, gas and hydrocarbon lease trom Respondent, Utah
Division of State Lands and Forestry,

(hereinafter the "Di-

vision"), for property in San Juan County, Utah, described
as follows:
Lots 3, 4, 5 and 6, and the South half of the
Northwest quarter and the South half in Section 2, of
Township 27 South, Range 20 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, containing 509.18 acres.
Also, the North half of the Southeast quarter of
Section 8, Township 27 South, Range 21 East, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian, containing 80 acres.
Appellant made application to lease this land under
the so-called "first applicant" procedure set forth in §651-45 U.C.A.

(1953), as amended; the property in question

had nQt. been posted by the Division as available for
leasing pursuant to the competitive bidding procedures
provided in subsection (2) of §65-1-45.

*

On March 24, 1980, Appellant and the Division entered
into State Mineral Lease No. 37794, which purported to lease

* The 1983 Legislature amended §65-1-45 and, as

amended, the "first applicant" procedure is set forth
in subsection (1) of §65-1-45 and the competitive
bidding procedures are set forth in subsection (2).
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to Appellant the oil, gas and hydrocarbon rights to the
property in question.

(R. 5)

However, subsequently the

Division discovered that the property lying in Lots 3, 4, 5,
6 and the South half of the Northwest quarter and the South
half in Section 2 of Township 27 South, Range 20 East, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, containing 509.18 acres,

(herein-

after "the 509.18 acre tract") had previously been withdrawn
from oil and gas leasing by the State Land Board (hereinafter,

"the Board") and,

gas leasing.

hence, was unavailable for oil and

(R. 63, 64) According to the Minutes of the

Board's June 14, 1966, hearing, the Board withdrew this
509.18 acre tract from oil and gas leasing because of its
proximity to the potash lands of the Cane Creek Anticline
which had been statutorily withdrawn from oil and gas
leasing by the Utah Legislature in 1961, Section 65-1-99
U.C.A (1953), as amended.
herein

(R. 64) All of the land discussed

(both the land which was legislatively withdrawn and

the land contained in the Plaintiff's lease which was
withdrawn by the State Land Board)

is now and has been at

all relevant times hereto part of a producing potash unit.
(R.

65, 66)
Upon discovering that the lease which had been issued

to Appellant included this withdrawn land, the Division, by
letter dated March 25, 1981, notified him that his mineral
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lease would have to be terminated as to the 509.18 acre
tract, and that all of the rr.onies l•etid to the lllv1s1on by
Appellant for rental of this tract would be refunded to him.
(R. 67)

Appellant appealed this action to the State Land

Board but at the hearing on this matter on August 12, 1981,
the Board rejected his claims and unanimously upheld the
Division's action to delete the withdrawn portion of the
property in question from his lease because the withdrawal
had not been lifted and also because the lands were not
posted for competitive bid, as required by Section 65-1-45
and the State of Utah Rules and Regulations Governing the
Issuance of Mineral Leases.

(R. 68)

Following this hearing the Division discovered that the
remaining 80 acres contained in Appellant's lease, the North
half of the southeast quarter of Section 8, Township 27
South, Range 21 East, Salt Lake Base and r.ieridian,

(herein-

after "the 80 acre tract"), had also been previously withdrawn by the State Land Board from oil and gas leasing by
a separate withdrawal order of the Board on June 8, 1967.
(R. 69, 70) The Division then immediately notified Appellant
by letter that because the remaining 80 acre tract had been
previously withdrawn from oil and gas leasing, the lease
would have to be cancelled.

In this letter the Division

also indicated it would refund the original filing fee and
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all of the remaining rentals paid by him for this property.
(R. 75)

Appellant appealed the cancellation of this remain-

ing 80 acre tract to the State Land Board.

At the Board's

hearing on November 10, 1981, at the State Land Board
hearing on this appeal, the Board unanimously upheld the
cancellation of the Appellant's lease, again on the grounds
that the property had been previously withdrawn from oil and
gas leasing and also because the property had not been
posted for competitive bid, as required by Section 65-1-45
and the State of Utah Rules and Regulations Governing the
Issuance of Mineral Leases.

(R. 71)

In order to explain more clearly the background of
this case, the Division identified on a map of this area
the portion of the land which was leased to Appellant, the
portion of the land which was withdrawn from oil and gas
leasing by the Board by its actions of June 14, 1966, and
June 8, 1967, and the portion of the land which was
statutorily withdrawn from oil and gas leasing by the Utah
Legislature in 1961.

(R. 72)

None of the land which was

leased to Appellant was that which was legislatively
withdrawn from oil and gas leasing but the legislatively
withdrawn land has been identified on the map to show its
proximity to the land withdrawn by the State Land Board.
For the Court's convenience, the same map that was included
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in the record for the trial court (R. 72)

has been attached

hereto as Appendix "A."
In January 1982 the Division refunded all of the
monies paid by Appellant under his lease.

On February

13, 1982, Appellant sent the uncashed check back to the
State Treasurer and notified the Division that an action
would be initiated in the District Court to "test the
cancellation of the Lease No. 37794."

(R. 73)

Thereafter, the Division notified Appellant by letter
that the State refund check to him was being cancelled
and that he would be credited with that amount for any
other mineral lease held by him or, upon written request,
returned to him in cash.

(R. 74)

In March 1982 Appellant sent a check for the 1982
rental payment for the cancelled lease.

The Division

promptly returned his check and reaffirmed by letter that
State Mineral Lease No. 37794 was cancelled.

(R. 75)

The trial court granted summary judgment on two
grounds, first that Appellant had failed to comply with
the statutory jurisdictional requirements of §65-1-9(2)
U.C.A.

(1953), as amended, which provides that in order to

appeal for judicial review of a decision of the State Land
Board in a case such as this, a claimant must file a written
protest with respect thereto with the Board within ninety
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days after the final decision of the Board relating to such
matter.

In this case the Board issued its final decision

with respect to the cancellation of the mineral lease as to
the 509.18 acre tract on August 12, 1981.

(R. 68) With

respect to the cancellation of the rest of Appellant's lease
after it was discovered the remaining 80 acres were also
subject to a withdrawal order, the State Land Board issued
its final decision on November 10, 1981.

(R. 71) The only

written protest filed by Appellant to either of these Board
actions was his letter dated February 13, 1982.

73) As

(R.

the trial court noted in its Memorandum Decision, this
letter was dated 185 days after the August 12, 1981, decision and 96 days after the November 10, 1981, decision.

(R. 95, 96)
The second ground on which summary judgment was
granted against Appellant was that Appellant had failed to
comply with the relevant and applicable requirements of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, §63-30-1
(1953), as amended,

~ ~.,

U.C.A.

(specifically, §§63-30-12, 15 and 19),

which pertain to actions involving property and which must
be satisfied for there to be a waiver of immunity.

Appel-

lant concedes he made no attempt to comply with these
jurisdictional requirements.
pp. 3 and 4)
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(R. 102 and Appellant's Brief,

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE JURISDICTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS OF §65-1-9(2) U.C.A. (1953), AS AMENDED,
AND IS, THEREFORE, BARRED FROM f!AINTAINING THIS ACTION.
The trial court held that Appellant failed to comply
with the jurisdictional requirements for judicial review as
provided in §65-1-9(2) U.C.A.
65-1-9 (2)

(1953), as amended.

Section

provides:

No claimant for lands under control of the board
can appeal for judicial review of a decision of the
board involving any sale. lease, or disposition of
state lands. or any action relating thereto, unless
such claimant files a written protest with respect
thereto with the board within ninety days after the
final decision of the board relating to such matter;
or, with respect to decisions rendered prior to the
effective date of this act, within ninety days after
such effective date.
This provision shall not relate
to disputes between the board and any party as to the
ownership or title to any lands.
[Emphasis added.]
The language of this statute could hardly be more
clear.

In order for Appellant to appeal for judicial

review of the decisions of the State Land Board, he had to
file a written protest with respect to the decisions within
ninety days.

In this case there were two final decisions of

the State Land Board: one pertaining to the 509.18 acre
tract and one pertaining to the 80 acre tract.

The facts

of this case show clearly that Appellant failed to file a
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written protest timely with respect to either of these
decisions.
With regard to the 509.18 acre tract, upon discovering the tract was subject to a withdrawal order and,
therefore, not available for oil and gas leasing, the Division of State Lands and Forestry, by letter dated March
25, 1981, notified Appellant the 509.18 acre tract would
have to be deleted from the mineral lease.

Appellant

requested State Land Board review of this Division action
but at the hearing on this appeal on August 12, 1981, the
Board unanimously decided the 509.18 acre tract should be
deleted from the lease and Appellant's advance rental
payment for that tract should be refunded to him.

This

Board action was the only Board action taken regarding the
509.18 acre tract, and it was clearly a final decision of
the Board.

Pursuant to §65-1-9(2), Appellant had ninety

days to file a written protest to this final decision;
however, the facts demonstrate that the only communication
from Appellant which could be construed as a written protest
of the Board's decision was his February 13, 1982, letter,
which came a full 185 days after the Board's August 12,
1981, decision.
\vith regard to the 80 acre tract, upon discovering
that the 80 acre tract was also subject to a withdrawal
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and, therefore, not available for oil and gas leasing, an
employee of the Division of State Lands and Forestry, by
letter dated August 12, 1981, not1f1ed Appellant of the
error and of his intention to recommend to the Director
that the remaining 80 acres of the lease be cancelled and
all of the balance of the payments previously tendered by
Appellant be refunded to him.

On August 17, 1981, the

Director cancelled the lease.

Evidently this action was not

communicated to Appellant because on October 29, 1981, he
wrote to the Division asking if the Director had cancelled
the 80 acre tract.

Also in that letter, Appellant

requested, pursuant to Section 65-1-9, U.C.A.

(1953), as

amended, and the Rules and Regulations of the Division of
State Lands, a "hearing before the land board regarding the
purported deletion of the 80 acres from my lease." (R. 25)
This letter made no mention of the Board's action regarding
the 509.18 acre tract.

At the Board's November 10, 1981,

hearing, the Board unanimously upheld the cancellation of
Appellant's lease.

As with the 509.18 acre tract, the only

written communication which could be construed as a written
protest to this final decision of the Board was Appellant's
February 13, 1982, letter, which, even if it were to be
assumed that the letter was "filed" with the Board on the
same day it was written, came 96 days after the November 10,
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1981, final decision of the State Land Board.
Notwithstanding the plain meaning of §65-1-9(2),
Appellant argues §65-1-9(2)

should be read in conjunction

with §§65-1-1 and 2.1, U.C.A.

(1953), as amended, to the

conclusion that in this case the State Land Board should
never have even been involved to review the Division's
action.
Appellant's argument goes something like this:

as

originally organized the State Land Board was the only state
agency involved in state lands management, and it handled
the day-to-day management as well as the policy-making
responsibilities with respect thereto.

Then in 1967 when

the §§65-1-1 and 2.1 were enacted, the Legislature created a
division of state lands to handle the day-to-day operations
and the board of state lands to be responsible for all
policy-making functions, powers, duties,
sibilities.

rights and respon-

Rather than legislatively decide which pro-

visions of Title 65 involve policy-making functions and
which do not, the Legislature stated in §65-1-1:
[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this act,
whenever reference is made in Title 65, or in any other
provision of law, to the state land board it shall be
construed as referring to the board of state lands
where such reference pertains to policy-making
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functions, powers, duties, rishts and res['ons1L,il ities;
but in all other instances such reference shall be
construed as referring tot he division of state lands.
Thus, the Legislature left it to the Board of State
Lands to decide what functions involve policy-making and
what do not.
Appellant's argument continues, because §65-1-9(2)
consistently refers to "the board," and a decision of "the
board," in light of §§65-1-1 and 2.1 every time the words
"the board" appear the words "the division" must be
substituted instead, to the conclusion there really is no
appeal of a Division action to the Board, the Board is a
non-entity so far as review of Division action is concerned,
and it is only the Division that acts and then reviews
itself.

Thus, Appellant's protest of the Divition action

to cancel his lease interests is the only protest that is
required by §65-1-9(2).

Respondent submits this interpre-

tation of these statutory provisions is not only strained
and irrational, it is unsupported by law, unworkeable on a
day-to-day basis, and contrary to Appellant's own view of
the relative roles as evicenced by his actions in this
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case.*
First, Appellant's argument requires this Court to
ignore the very plain language of §65-1-9(2) that it is the
Board that is to make final decisions for lands under its
control and timely written protest must be given thereto
before a claimant can appeal for judicial review.
Second, assuming Appellant is contending that it is the
Division that takes and action such as the one in this case
and it is the Division Director who reviews that action,

*

Appellant states on pp. 7 and 8 of his brief that
§§65-1-1 and 2.1 provide that it is the Executive
Director of the Department of Natural Resources who
actually makes final decisions with respect to matters
other than those determining policy for the Division of
State Lands.
Although Respondent is somewhat unclear
as to whether Appellant is really suggesting the
Executive Director of the Department of Natural
Resources has the role of reviewing day-to-day land
management decisions, such interpretation is wholly
unsupported by the enabling legislation pertaining to
the Executive Director of the Department of Natural
Resources.
§63-34-1 t l fil2·, U.C.A. (1953), as
amended, which provides for the Department of Natural
Resources which coordinates ten different state boards
and seven different state agencies; and these statutes
make abundantly clear the Executive Director's essential role is "the administration and supervision of the
department of natural resouces" to effect "coordination
and co-operation among the boards and divisions of
it •... " Section 63-34-5 U.C.A. (1983 Interim Supplement, Part 2, pp. 888 and 889).
Although the statute
requires the Executive Director to do "such other
duties as the Legislature shall assign to him," it is
preposterous to suggest the Executive Director has been
legislatively assigned the specific additional duty to
review all of the hundreds of lease actions the
Division may take throughout any given year.
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such a contention ignores the statutory scheme of Title 65,
which makes the Division and che Di1ector <Jne r,nd the same.
Pursuant to §65-1-3.l, the Director of r.he Division is the
executive and administrative head of the Division.

More-

over, what Appellant is asserting is that a Division staff
employee could make an official Division decision which
could be protested and appealed to the Division Director.
Title 65 does not provide for such an intra-agency review
process.

Thus, what Appellant is asserting is that it is

the Division Director who would make a final decision on a
Division cancellation of a state oil and gas lease, and this
is nothing more than to say there is no administrative
review at all of such an action.
Third,

if the plain language of §65-1-9(2) were to

be ignored, and the Court were to consider whether the
cancellation involves a policy-making function such that
it was appropriate for the Board to review the Division
cancellation of Appellant's lease pursuant to §65-1-9(2),
it seems reasonable to assume that virtually every action
by the Division to cancel a lease necessarily involves
some policy-making function,
responsibility.

power, duty,

right or

Certainly that is how the Board has

interpreted its responsibilities because it is the Board
and not the Division that reviews such matters in every
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case.
Fourth, because the Board has itself determined the
hearing of all appeals of Division lease actions to be a
legitimate exercise of its responsibilities, as this Court
held in Colman y. Utah State Land Board, 17 Utah 2d 14,
19, 403 P.2d 781, 784 (1965), this determination must be
treated as prima facie correct and not regarded otherwise
so long as the function conforms with the general objections
the agency is charged to carry out and there is a rational
basis for it in the provisions of the law.
Fifth, even if it were somehow to be concluded that
Board review of Division lease actions was not in every
case appealable to the Board, but for only those matters
which involve a policy consideration, certainly under the
facts of this case review of the cancellation of Appellant's
lease involves a policy consideration.

In this matter the

Board had previously withdrawn two tracts from oil and gas
leasing and there could hardly be a clearer example of a
land management policy decision than a decision to withdraw
lands from leasing.

It only stands to reason that con-

sideration of whether a lease for those withdrawn should
be permitted in direct contradiction to those withdrawals
is, therefore, also a policy decision.
Sixth, Appellant's argument that the Director's actions
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terminating the lease should be the "final decisions" as
contemplated in §65-1-9(2)
level.

is unworkable on a day to day

Instead of having an orderly process of Division

action and Board review of that action, a claimant for lands
administered by the Division and the Board would have to
guess to whom he should request review and hope he guesses
correctly.
Finally, the Appellant's argument is utterly inconsistent with his own view of the relative roles of the
Division and the Board, as evidenced by his own actions in
this case.

In both instances when the Division notified him

of its intent to terminate the respective tracts of land
Appellant requested review by the Board of that Division
action.

Indeed, Mr. Adkins'

letter dated October 29, 1981,

pertaining to the deletion of the 80 acre tract states:
"[p]ursuant to Section 65-1-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, and the Rules and Regulations of the Division of
State Lands, I hereby request a hearing before the land
board regarding the purported deletion of the 80 acres from
my lease."

(R. 25)

As a final note, the Appellant complains that the
plain reading of §65-1-9(2)

requires a claimant upset with

a Division action to request a hearing before the Board,
obtain a ruling from the Board and then,

-18-

if still unhappy

with the Board ruling, file a timely written protest with
the Board in order to appeal for judicial review.

He says

this does not make sense because this procedure would only
accomplish "a second appeal to the Board of State Lands or
to the Director of Natural Resources."

However, this is

simply a mistatement of the ordinary process for review and
of what happened in this case.
followed in this case was

The procedure that was

(1) an action by the Division,

(2)

a request by the claimant for Board review of that action,
(3)

Board review of that action.

Where the process broke

down for the Appellant was his failure to comply with §65-19 (2), as he was obliged to do.

I t is not for ll.ppellant to

second guess the wisdom of §65-1-9(2) but it certainly is
his obligation to comply with it.

And in view of the fact

the plain wording of that provision requires a claimant to
comply and in this case he simply did not, he has waived his
right to obtain judicial review of his claims.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE JURISDICTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT,
SECTION §63-30-1 LT .s.E.Q., (1953), AS AMENDED.
The trial court held also that Appellant failed to
comply with the relevant and applicable requirements of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 63-30-1

~ ~.,

U.C.A.

(1953), as amended, which pertain to actions involving
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property and which must be satisfied for there to be a
waiver of governmental immunity.
At the outset of Point II it is important to state
what Respondent is nQt. contending. Respondent is not
contending that this is the sort of action for the State
is immune from suit under the Governmental Immunity Act.
To the contrary, Respondent has consistently asserted that
this is an action involving property, for which, pursuant
to §63-30-6 U.C.A.

(1953), as amended,

immunity has been

waived so long as the other requirements of the Governmental
Immunity Act have been met.

With this in mind, Respondent

submits the trial court correctly held that Appellant failed
to comply with relevant and applicable requirements of the
Governmental Immunity Act, and, therefore, cannot now
maintain this action.
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act is an act which
provides exceptions, limitations and conditions on the immunity which is generally accorded to governmental entities,
including the Respondent in this action.
U.C.A (1981 Supp.)

Section 63-3-3

provides:

Except as may be otherwise provided in this
act, all governmental entities are immune from suit
for any injury which results from the exercise of a
governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital,
nursing home, or other governmental health care
facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, or
other professional health care clinical training
program conducted in either public or private
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facilities.
The Act specifically waives certain kinds of actions
from immunity,

including actions such as the one before the

Court involving property, Section 63-30-6 U.C.A.
amended.

(1953), as

Section 63-30-6 provides:

Immunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived for the recovery of any property real or
personal or for the possession thereof or to quiet
title thereto, or to foreclose mortgages or other liens
thereon or to determine any adverse claim thereon, or
secure any adjudication touching any mortgage or other
lien said entity may have or claim on the property
involved.
For those actions in which immunity has been waived
(except actions involving contractual obligations) the Act
provides several requirements to be met by claimants in
order for them to be able to bring actions against governmental entities.

The requirements of the Act which are

relevant to the case at bench include Section 63-30-12
U.C.A.

(1981 Supp.) which requires a notice of claim to be

filed with the Attorney General and the Agency concerned
within one year after the cause of action arises.

Section

63-30-12 provides:
A claim against the state is barred unless notice
of claim is filed with the attorney general and the
agency concerned within one year after the cause of
action arises.
Section 63-30-15 provides that a suit against the State may
be filed only if and after such claim is denied.
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In this

case Appellant did not file a notice of claim with either
the Attorney General or the Division of State Lands and
Forestry.
Appellant also failed to file an undertaking pursuant
to Section 63-30-19 U.C.A.

(1953), as amended, which pro-

vides as follows:
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff
shall file an undertaking in a sum fixed by the court,
but in no case less than the sum of $300, conditioned
upon payment by the plaintiff of taxable costs incurred
by the governmental entity in the action if the
plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or fails to
recover judgment.
Although Section 63-30-6 waives immunity as to actions
involving property, there is no question Appellant must
comply with the notice and undertaking requirements of Sections 63-30-12 and 19 in order to bring an action against
a State agency.

Ash v. State, Utah, 572 P.2d 1374 (1977).

Accord, Walton y. State Road Commission, Utah, 558 P.2d
609, 611 (1976), in which this Court held
••. this case is determinable on the sole ground of
failure to file a claim required by Title 63-30-12,
U.C.A. 1953, which bars a claim under the Government
Immunity Act unless written notice is filed with the
Utah Attorney General and the agency concerned within
one year after the cause of action arises.
In the instant case Appellant's cause of action is barred
because he did not comply with these jurisdictional notice
requirements and the undertaking requirements.
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On appeal Appellant argues that Standiford v, Salt
Lake City Corporation, Utah, 605 P.2d 1236 (1980), Johnson
v. Salt Lake City Corporation, Utah, 629 P.2d 432 (1981),
and Thomas y, Clearfield City, Utah, 642 P.2d 737 (1982),
support his contention that the facts of this case Respondent cannot claim immunity from suit.

But these cases

simply do not apply because Respondent bas not asserted that
the State is immune from suit because the action involves
the exercise of a governmental function.

To the contrary,

§63-30-6 clearly waives immunity; but despite this waiver of
immunity, based on the Act itself and the cases cited above,
Appellant was still obliged to comply with the legislatively
mandated notice, claim and undertaking requirements.

In

view of the fact Appellant failed to so comply, he is barred
from maintaining this action.
Appellant's final argument pertaining to the Governmental Immunity Act is that this case really involves an
action arising out of a contractual obligation as provided
in §63-30-5 and is, therefore, not conditioned upon compliance with the notice, claim and undertaking requirements
of the Act.

The trial court in its Memorandum Decision

rejected this contention on the ground "such interpretation of the state-granted leases does not comport with
the general intent and history of the dealings of the
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parties." Although, as Appellant asserts,

it is generally

held that a lease is more of a contract than a conveyance of
an estate, the general rule is JUSt the opposite when it
involves a mineral or oil and gas lease.
AmJur.2d Gas and Oil §69 (1968).

See, generally, 38

Because of this property

interest, an oil and gas lease is distinguished from a lease
that creates an ordinary landlord-tenant relationship.

E.g.,

Vanzandt v. Heilman, 54 N.M. 97, 214 P.2d 864

(1950).

Thus, cases such as t1edical-Dental Building Co.

of Los Anaeles y. Horton and Converse, 21 Cal.2d 411, 132
P.2d 457 (1942), which was cited by Appellant, have no
application to mineral leases.
POINT III
THE STATE OIL AND GAS LEASE ISSUED TO APPELLANT WAS
PROPERLY TERMINATED BECAUSE THE LANDS IN THE LEASE
HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM OIL AND GAS LEASING BY ORDER
OF THE STATE LAND BOARD AND WERE, THEREFORE, UNAVAILABLE TO BE LEASED TO ANYONE.
Because the trial court decided Appellant did not
comply with the jurisdictional requirements of §65-1-9(2)
and §63-30-1

~ ~.,

the court did not reach his other

claims regarding the termination of the lease.

And,

assuming this Court affirms the trial court on the
jurisdictional issues, obviously these claims do not
need to be reviewed on appeal.

However,

in the event this

Court reverses the trial court on the jurisdictional issues,
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Respondent submits Appellant is still not entitled to the
oil and gas lease because the oil and gas interest was
withdrawn from leasing by the State Land Board and was,
therefore, unavailable to be leased to anyone.
As mentioned in the Introduction to this brief, this
lawsuit resulted because a state oil, gas and hydrocarbon
lease was issued when it should not have been.

In the

event the Court reaches the merits of Appellant's claims,
it is critical to keep in mind what Appellant is really
asking is that due to inadvertence or oversight on the part
of the state agency, a mineral lease 1!l.!..W.t. be issued to a
private individual when the policy-making board charged with
the management of that publicly-owned land had previously
determined the public interest would be best served by
withdrawing the subject land from that kind of mineral
entry.

Such a result would be disastrous to Respondent in

this case which is charged with the responsibility of
managing 3.6 million acres of land within this state.

To

hold this agency to a standard of perfection in its administrative functions regarding mineral leases would gravely
impair its ability to perform its management responsibilities.
In Point III of his brief, Appellant contends he should
be entitled to lease the 509.18 acre tract of land on the
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theory that as of June 14, 1966, when the State Land Board
withdrew that tract from oil and gas

leasin~,

the Board

lacked the authority to withdraw lands from any type of
mineral leasing.

This contention is simply without merit.

Although it is true that as of June 1966 there was no
statutory provision expressly authorizing the Board to
make such withdrawals, the Board certainly had discretion to
withdraw land from certain kinds of mineral entry if it
determined that development of the two separate mineral
interests would conflict with one another.

This power is

necessarily implicit in the Board's statutory land management responsibilities, and the Board's authority to order
withdrawals as this Court expressly acknowledged in

~

in Archer v. State Land Board, 15 Utah 2d 321, 322, 392
P.2d 622, 623

(1964).

In addition, Section 65-1-95 U.C.A., as it provided at
the time the Board made this withdrawal

(it has since been

repealed), authorized the Board to "make and enforce rules
and regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of this
act for carrying the same into effect."

Although the Board

did not have a specific rule or regulation describing its
withdrawal capability, even apart from the fact the Board
ordered these withdrawals,

it is evident the Board has

consistently interpreted its discretion as including such
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authority because Rule 12(d) of its Rules and Regulations
Governing the Issuance of Mineral Leases (revised to include
a~endments

to October 13, 1966) referred to "minerals on

State lands which have been withdrawn from mineral
leasing" [emphasis added].

(R.

76, 77)

Finally, as this Court held in Whitmore y. Candland,
47 Utah 77, 88, 181 P. 528, 532 (1915), "[t]he whole matter
of making disposition of the State's land was placed in the
hands and under the control of the State Land Board."

And

in the matter of making disposition of state lands, the
Board has discretion in making management decisions, G.L.fill1.
v. State Land Board, 26 Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d 1035 (1971).
In ordering the 1966 withdrawal, it is obvious from the
Board's action of ordering the withdrawal of the 509.18 acre
tract from oil and gas leasing that the Board viewed
withdrawal as a legitimate exercise of its discretionary
management responsiblities.
~,

Although Archer y, State Land

supra, clearly recognizes the authority of the Board

to withdraw lands from mineral leases under appropriate
circumstances, should there be any question remaining that
this authority was necessarily implicit in the Board's land
ffianagement capabilities, the fact the Board itself considered this to be a legitimate exercise of its responsibilities must be treated as prima facie correct and not
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regarded otherwise so long as the function conforms with the
general objectives it is charged to carry out and there is a
rational basis for it in the provisions of the law, Colman
y. Utah State Land Board, 17 Utah 2d 14, 19, 403 P.2d 781,
784

(1965), wherein the Court held:
Where such uncertainty exists the interpretation
and application of statutes adopted by the administrative agency is usually looked upon with some indulgence.
It is both just and practical that the Board
should be allowed considerable latitute of discretion
in deciding what policies will best carry out the
responsibilities imposed upon it.
Due to the considerrations just stated, and because of its experience and
presumed expert knowledge in its field, an administrative interpretation and application of a statute ...
is generally regarded as prima facie correct and not to
be overturned so long as it is in conformity with the
general objectives the agency is charged with carrying
out, and there is a rational basis for it in the
provisions of the law.
Finally, in Grant y. State Land Board, supra,

26 Utah 2d at 103, 485 P.2d at 1037, this Court considered
the nature of the State Land Board's land management responsibilities, holding that "[t]he general purpose of the law
in giving the Land Board responsibility for administering
the public lands is to encourage their settlement and
development so that they and their resources can be widely
used, managed and conserved."

There can be no question

the Board's withdrawal of the 509.18 acre tract was consistent with proper land management objectives because it
added additional protection to the potash development in the
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Cane Creek area which the Legislature had previously sought
to protect and promote, and, therefore, the 1966 decision to
withdraw the 509.18 tract was a permissible and desirable
exercise of land management discretion.
Appellant cites Hirsh y. Ogden Furniture and Carpet
.{;Q.,

51 Utah 558, 172 P. 318 (1918), in support of his

argument that the Board's withdrawal of the 509.18 tract was
invalid in absence of an express statutory grant of power to
withdraw lands from leasing prior to 1967 when the Legislature amended §65-1-45 to provide the specific authority to
withdraw state lands from leasing.

In H..iLfill the Court

considered whether a notice of filing a remittitur had to be
given a party under a statute that was silent as to notice
but which was subsequently amended to require notice.

The

Court held there was nothing in the statute requiring
such notice and the subsequent amendment indicated the
legislative intent that such notice was not required prior
to the amendment.

.lii.r...s.h is relied on by Appellant for

the general rule that an addition in a statute shoula be
regarded as a departure from the previous law.
~

does not aFply to the instant case for at

least two reasons: first,

unlike H...i.Lfill, this case con-

cerns whether in the absence of an express statutory authorization, an authority to take a certain kind of action could
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be implied from the broad statutory grant of authority
providing for policy discretion.

.lii..I..l2.h concerned an

analysis of whether a precedural requirement should be
implied when apparently there was no statute from which a
requirement could be implied.

In this case the Board was

charged with broad land management discretion by statute,
and the Board construed withdrawal as a reasonable,

rational

and, in this case, necessary exercise of the existing
statutory grant of land management discretion to promote
potash development.

Under Colman y. Utah State Land

.B.Q<u.Q, supra, that interpretation must be treated as
~

correct.

~

Second, and perhaps even more important,

unlike in .li.iJ:..s.h, in this case the Utah Supreme Court has
already acknowledged in dicta the Board's power to
withdraw land from leasing for good cause shown as a
reasonable exercise of that discretion.
Land Board, supra. Obviously,

in~

Archer y. State
there was no such

judicial recognition of the existence of a notice requirement.
Therefore, unlike in

~.

no reason exists in this

case to support the view that the Legislature, by amending
§65-1-45 in 1967 expressly to include the power to withdraw
land from certain kinds of mineral entry, meant to change
the law to provide for a new tool for responsible land
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management.

To the contrary, based on the broad statutory

grant of discretion in Title 65 and the case law discussed
herein, there can be no question that by amending §65-1-45
in 1967 the Legislature intended only to codify and clarify
the already existing authority to withdraw lands under
appropriate circumstances.
POINT IV
EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THE 509.18 ACRE TRACT WAS
AVAILABLE FOR LEASING BECAUSE THE WITHDRAWAL WAS
INVALID, APPELLANT IS STILL NOT ENTITLED TO LEASE THE
509.18 ACRE TRACT BECAUSE THE LEASE WAS NOT ACQUIRED
THROUGH THE COMPETITIVE BIDDING PROCEDURES REQUIRED BY
§65-1-45 U.C.A. (1953) 1 AS AMENDED.
Appellant contends that with respect to the 509.18 acre
tract which had been withdrawn from oil and gas leasing by
order of the State Land Board in 1966 (R. 64), he should be
entitled to lease the tract because (a) the 1966 withdrawal
was void because the Board did not have the authority to
order the withdrawal

(as discussed in Point III) _gn_Q (b)

under §65-1-45 U.C.A. as that statute provided in 1966, he
was entitled to lease the interest because he was the first
applicant for the interest.

It should be noted in order for

Appellant to prevail on the claim this Court would have to
hold that the 1966 withdrawal was unlawful and void .fill.d
that Appellant could lease the land merely by making application and thereby avoid the competitive leasing requirement
of §65-1-45.

Point III addresses the withdrawal issue; this
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Point IV addresses Appellant's contention he is entitled to
lease the 509.18 acre tract under the "first applicant"
procedure of §65-1-45.
At the outset it should also be noted that Appellant's
argument in Points III and IV pertain only to the 509.18
acre tract.

Appellant has conceded that as to the 80 acre

tract the Board's 1967 withdrawal was proper.

(R. 137-139,

141)
With respect to the 509.18 acre tract, the State Land
Board, at its August 12, 1981, hearing to review the
Division's action to delete this tract from Appellant's oil
and gas lease, ruled the Division had acted properly to
delete the tract from the lease on the .t'n'Q grounds that
the tract was subject to the withdrawal .fill.d because the
lands had not "been posted for simultaneous filing."

(R. 68)

The Board's reference to "simultaneous filing" relates to
one of the only two ways one can obtain a state mineral
lease: as a "first applicant" or as a result of being the
highest bidder pursuant to the competitive leasing procedure, as provided in §65-1-45.
As a threshold matter, the parties dispute what law applies to this question.

Appellant argues that §65-1-45 as

it provided in 1966 aFplies.
follows:

This provision stated as

Except as otherwise provided by law, applications
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to lease shall be considered in the order filed; provided, that when simultaneous applications are filed
the land board shall let the land to the applicant who
will pay the highest rental therefor; and provided
further, that applications to lease land already under
lease, shall not be received before the day following
the expiration of said lease, and all such applications
received on such day shall be considered simultaneous.
In all cases where lands become available for
leasing by the state because they are newly acquired or
because a previous mineral lease is cancelled or otherwise terminated by the board, such land shall be offered for mineral lease by the following procedure .•••
[Competitive bidding procedures set forth.]
Respondent asserts, however, the law that controls
is the law as it read when Appellant filed his application
to lease this land.

The law as it read in March 1980 when

Appellant made his application provided as follows:
Except as otherwise provided herein applications
to lease state lands for mineral purposes shall be
considered in the order in which they are filed. The
division of state lands shall have the authority to
withdraw state lands from leasing, but unless state
lands are withdrawn and except as otherwise provided
herein, the division shall lease the land to the first
qualified applicant who has filed an application in
accordance with rules and regulations promulgated by
the board of state lands.
In all cases where lands become available for
leasing by the division because they are newly
acquired, or because an existing mineral lease is
canceled, relinquished, surrendered, or for any reason
terminates, except where the division determines it is
not in the best interest of the state to offer the land
for lease, the division shall offer the land for
subsequent mineral leasing by the following procedure
only ..• , [Competitive bidding procedures set forth.] *
Since 1980 ~65-1-~5 has been amended twice: once in
1981, see U.C.A. Second Replacement Volume 7A 1981
Pocket Supplement; and once in 1983, see U.C.A. 1983
Interim Supplement, Part 2, pp. 960, 961.
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However, even assuming, arguendo, the older version
of §65-1-45 applies, Appellant is still not entitled to
lease the land as a first applicant.

Under the older

version of §65-1-45, the Appellant could not lease the land
as a first applicant because the land had become available
for leasing "because a previous mineral lease [had been]
cancelled or otherwise terminated by the board." In this
matter, there was a previous mineral lease on the 509.18
acre tract that had been cancelled by the Board on February
14, 1966, for nonpayment of rental.

The only evidence in

the record regarding this previous lease appears in the
Minutes of the State Land Board's June 14, 1966, hearing in
which the Board withdrew the 509.18 acre tract from oil and
gas leasing.

(R. 63, 64) The t-iinutes,

in pertinent part,

state:
Oil and gas lease t\L 6790, MLA 5436, was issued on
March 18, 1955, on All Sec. 2, T. 27 S., R. 20 E., SLM,
containing 698.64 acres.
This land is on the southwest
flank of the Cane Creek Anticline.
ML 6790 was cancelled on February 14, 1966, for
nonpayment of rental for the portion of its term from
January 1, 1966 [sic] until April 1, 1966.
Obviously, assuming the oil and gas interest was even
available for leasing,

in view of the fact the previous

mineral lease was cancelled by the Board, under either
version of §65-1-45 the only way the oil and gas could be
leased was through the simultaneous bidding procedures.
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Nevertheless, without any evidentiary support,
whatsoever, Appellant claims the Minutes of the Board
hearing, which are a public record, are simply wrong.
Appellant's arguments are nothing more than speculation
and mere conjecture.

In view of the fact there is no

evidence contrary to the Minutes of the June 14, 1966,
Board hearing as to the reason for the cancellation of the
previous mineral lease, this evidence must be regarded as
correct.

See Wendling v. Cundall, Utah, 568 P.2d 888

(1977).
Appellant argues that the date of the cancellation
of the previous mineral lease does not square with the date
the primary term of the mineral lease would have ended.

But

Respondent submits that this does not by itself raise any
fact sufficient to raise a question as to the accuracy of
the Minutes of the Board's hearing.
POINT V
RESPONDENT CANNOT EE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING
THE LEASE TO APPELLANT IS INVALID.
Appellant claims that Respondent should be estopped
from asserting the lease to him was invalid, and he assigns
two reasons for that position: first, he claims the
Division did not notify him that the Board upheld the
Division's recommendation of cancellation on the ground the
simultaneous leasing procedures were not followed as well as
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because of the prior withdrawals.

Second, he suggests the

Division should be estopped because it "n:isled" him "into
believing that certain lands were avail2ble for leasing
[and]

that he was qualified to lease theD."

(Appellant's

brief, p. 17.)
The Utah Supreme Court held in First Equity Carporation of Florida v. Utah State University, Utah, 544
P.2d 887

(1975), that estoppel cannot be asserted against a

governmental entity when that entity has acted in excess of
its statutory power, such as the Division did in this case
when it mistakenly issued the lease to Appellant when the
lands were unavailable for leasing.

Accord, Utah State

University y. Sutro and Co., Utah, 646 P.2d 715, 718
(1982), wherein the Court stated:
We have no doubt about the soundness of the rule
that estoppel generally is not assertable against the
government or governmental institutions.
There are
good and sufficient reasons for that rule, including
the safeguarding the interests of the public.
In this case Appellant would have this Court estop
Respondent from trying to undo the mistake it made in
issuing the mineral lease despite the existence of the
withdrawals on the subject land.

And not only that, Ap-

pellant wants this Court to estop Respondent from alleging
that even if the land had been available for leasing,
because the land had been subJect to a previous mineral
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lease that had been cancelled, §65-1-45 requires that the
Division could only lease the land under the simultaneous
filing procedures.

Estoppel is not appropriate in this case

because cancellation of Appellant's lease for these reasons
is necessary to safeguard the interests of the public.

The

withdrawals from oil and gas leasing by the Board were to
safeguard what it had determined to be the public interest
in fostering the potash development of those lands, and the
Division cannot, either intentionally or by mistake, undo
that revocation or otherwise act in such a way to nullify
that Board action.

And with respect to §65-1-45, the

statute clearly requires when a previous lease is cancelled,
as the undisputed evidence in this case shows, the Division
must lease the land only by the competitive bidding
procedure.

This Court construed the legislative intent

embodied in the competitive bidding procedure of §65-1-45 in
Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 17 Utah 2d 14, 403 P.2d
781

(1965), in which the Court held that this procedure

safeguards the interest of the public:
The statutes we have referred to should be
considered together and in connection with the entire
act and harmonized insofar as possible with the
carrying out of the responsibilities the Land Board is
charged with of managing the public lands of the State
in the most prudent and profitable manner possible.
Viewed in conformity with that objective, it appears to
be intended that when mineral leasing rights are "first
available for leasing" they should be put on the open
market and an opportunity for competitive bidding be
-37-

given.
This safeguards the interests of the State by
getting the best price a qualified bidder will pay, and
also protects the interest of all persons who might be
interested by allowing them a fair opportunity to bid.
17 Utah 2d at 18.
An exception to the general rule that estoppel
generally is not assertable against a governmental entity
arises if a party can show that manifest injustice would
result if estoppel could not be asserted against the
governmental entity, Utah State University y. Sutro and

.l:Q., Celebrity Club. Inc. y. Utah Liguor Control, Utah,
602 P.2d 689

(1979), but the facts of this case do not

warrant invoking this exception.

All of the monies paid by

Appellant have either been refunded to him, offered to be
refunded to him, or offered to be credited to any other
account Appellant has with the Division.

Further, Appel-

lant had not begun drilling operations under the lease nor
had he even explored for oil and gas before the Division
terminated the lease.

(R. 68) Appellant complains he was

somehow disadvantaged because the Division, in informing him
of the Board's final decision,

did not list the fact that

the land had not been put up for competitive bid as one of
the reasons the Board upheld the Division's cancellation.
But this contention overlooks the fact the record clearly
shows that the competitive bidding issue was one of the two
grounds on which the Board based its decision in both Board

-3 8-

hearings pertaining to Appellant's lease (R. 68, 71),
Appellant had requested both of these hearings, and the
Minutes of these hearings show this issue as a factor in the
Board's decision.

Appellant has failed to demonstrate that

estoppel is appropriate in this case.
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly ruled Appellant failed to
comply with the requirements for judicial review, §65-1-9(2)
U.C.A.

(1953), as amended, under the clear and undisputed

facts of this case, and with the requirements for waiver of
governmental immunity, §63-30-1 t l
amended.

~·,

U.C.A.

(1953), as

Notwithstanding Appellant's erroneous, cumbersome

and impractical construction of the relevant and applicable
statutes, the plain fact is Appellant simply failed to do
what these statutes require him to do to maintain this
action.
Because Appellant did not satisfy the applicable
jurisdictional requirements, the trial court did not reach
the other claims raised by Appellant.

Obviously, assuming

this Court affirms the trial court, these claims do not need
to be reviewed on appeal.

However, even if these claims are

reviewed, the land involved in this lawsuit is subject to
two previous withdrawals which are valid and binding, and
the land simply is not available to be leased to anyone, not
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even the Appellant.

If this land ever becomes available for

leasing by the Division, it will only do so at :c.ucli time as
those withdrawals are revoked and the land is

~ut

up for

competitive bid.
It is respectfully submitted that the Order Granting
Summary Judgment entered by the trial court herein should be
affirmed in all respects.
DATED this 30th day of September, 1983.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

ANNE M. STIRBA
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

This is to certify that two copies of the foregoing
Brief of Respondent were mailed first class, postage
prepaid, to Bryce E. Roe of Roe and Fowler, Attorneys for
Appellant, 340 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111, this 30th day of September, 1983.
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